

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 14, 2026

Mr. Dara Khosrowshahi
Chief Executive Officer
Uber Technologies, Inc.
1725 3rd Street
San Francisco, CA 94158

Mr. David Risher
Chief Executive Officer and Director
Lyft, Inc.
185 Berry Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94107

Dear Mr. Khosrowshahi and Mr. Risher,

As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, I take seriously Congress's responsibility to ensure that markets remain competitive and that American consumers benefit from that competition. Given the scale of your platforms, and the importance of rideshare services to the Americans who depend on them, I write regarding concerns about rideshare pricing, driver compensation, and your use of algorithmic systems in app-based rideshare markets.

Background

Tens of millions of riders depend on rideshare services to reach work, medical care, pharmacies, airports, schools, or child-care. When the price of that trip moves sharply or differs from one rider to the next for reasons the rider cannot see, the rider usually has no way to learn why or to switch to a more affordable transportation alternative.

Uber and Lyft are the leading app-based rideshare platforms in the United States. Bloomberg Second Measure reported that, as of 2024, Uber accounted for roughly 76 percent of observed U.S. rideshare spending, with Lyft accounting for the remaining 24 percent.¹ These two companies account for the overwhelming majority of the market, employ real-time pricing systems, draw from an overlapping pool of drivers, and operate in markets characterized by significant network effects which warrants close Congressional oversight to evaluate whether consumers, drivers, and the competitive process are adequately protected.

Market Structure and Pricing Power

A rideshare platform may adjust prices in response to rider demand, driver availability, traffic, routing, time of day, and product type. Yet, opaque algorithmic pricing can make it difficult for

¹ *Bloomberg Second Measure*, "Uber vs. Lyft: Who's tops in the battle of U.S. rideshare companies" (Apr. 15, 2024) (reporting observed U.S. rideshare spending shares for March 2024).

consumers and drivers to distinguish market-responsive pricing from conduct that raises affordability, transparency, or competition concerns.

Public reporting and litigation have raised questions about how app-based rideshare platforms set rider fares, driver pay, whether the two have been decoupled, and how platform take rates have changed over time. Drivers have alleged that Uber and Lyft prevent independent-contractor drivers from setting their own fares.

Surveillance Pricing and Transparency

The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has sent letters to several companies, including Uber and Lyft, seeking information on artificial intelligence and consumer data, asking whether artificial intelligence and consumer data are being used to tailor prices to the individual.² A June 2026 Consumer Reports investigation found that riders who requested the same trip within moments of one another were quoted sharply different fares, creating a median gap of roughly 50 percent across the routes it tested.³ These matters illustrate why riders need clearer information about what data is used to set prices, and whether consumers are charged different fares based on personal characteristics or inferred willingness to pay.

Algorithmic Coordination and Antitrust Compliance

Federal antitrust law distinguishes lawful, independent pricing decisions from unlawful coordination among competitors. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, leaves firms free to price independently. It does not permit competitors to align their prices, trade competitively sensitive information, or reach the same result through a common vendor, a shared data feed, or any other intermediary. As pricing migrates into automated systems, the line between independent judgment and unlawful coordination increasingly runs through the data those systems ingest, the vendors that supply them, and the signals they exchange.

Driver Compensation and Platform Rules

Drivers decide when and where to work, whether to accept particular trips, and whether to drive for more than one platform, all based on the information available to them. If rider fares and driver pay are set by separate, opaque algorithms, drivers may be unable to tell whether their compensation reflects competitive market forces, platform rules, or individualized predictions about their willingness to accept lower pay.

Information Requests

I request that both companies provide written responses to the following questions, along with all referenced analyses, models, presentations, policies, audit materials, and internal documents by August 14th, 2026.

Fares and Driver Pay

1. Explain how the company arrives at the fare a rider is quoted and charged, and identify each category of data that enters that calculation.

² *House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform*, “Comer Investigates Use of Artificial Intelligence to Set Prices for Consumers” (Mar. 5, 2026).

³ *Spectrum News*, “Consumer Reports questions consistency of Uber and Lyft dynamic pricing” (updated June 16, 2026) (summarizing Consumer Reports findings and company responses).

2. Explain separately how the company arrives at the amount a driver is paid for a trip, and identify each category of data that enters that calculation.
3. State whether rider fares and driver pay are now calculated independently of one another. If they are, identify when that change took effect, who approved of it, and the reasons given for it. If they are not, describe how the two figures are linked or coordinated, when that method was adopted, and the reasons given for maintaining that link rather than calculating them independently.
4. Identify the individuals, committees, or units with authority to approve material changes to rider-pricing models, driver-pay models, or the policies that govern them.

Competitor Information and Market Monitoring

5. State whether the company collects, by monitoring, benchmarking, scraping, purchase, exchange, or any other means, current or near-current information about competitors' prices, incentives, wait times, promotions, or supply conditions.
6. For each category identified in response to Request 5, describe how it is obtained, how often it is refreshed, who within the company may see it, and how it informs pricing, pay, dispatch, or promotions.
7. State whether the company has access, directly or through any vendor, broker, consultant, or trade group, to nonpublic competitively sensitive information from or about the other addressee of this letter.

Vendors and Shared Tools

8. Identify every third-party vendor, data broker, pricing or revenue-management tool, market-intelligence service, and shared data sources the company uses in connection with fare-setting, pay-setting, demand forecasting, dispatch, promotions, or competitor monitoring.
9. For each one identified in response to Request 8, state whether, to the company's knowledge, it is also used by any competing rideshare or mobility platform.
10. Describe the contractual terms, data firewalls, access controls, audits, and compliance measures in place to keep competitively sensitive information from reaching a competitor through any of those vendors or tools.

Individualized Pricing

11. State whether the fare quoted to a rider can vary with characteristics of that rider or that rider's account, for instance, location or trip history, device type or battery level, payment method, subscription status, in-app behavior, prior acceptance or rejection of fares, or any segmentation or loyalty status the company assigns.
12. State whether the company runs experiments, A/B tests, or model training meant to estimate how much a rider will pay, how likely a rider is to accept a higher fare, or how a rider responds to price changes.
13. Explain how any crossed-out, "typical," "estimated," or other reference price shown to riders is derived, and state whether it reflects an actual prior fare or a figure the company generates for display.

Testing, Audit, and Compliance

14. Describe the human review, legal review, audit, and antitrust compliance controls that apply to the company's pricing and pay models.
15. State whether the company has ever tested those models for coordinated effects, discriminatory effects, or other competition or consumer-protection risks. If it has, produce the results, along with any recommendations made or changes adopted in response.

The Subcommittee intends to monitor these issues closely and may seek additional information.

I appreciate your prompt responses by August 14th, 2026.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Mike Lee", is positioned above the typed name and title.

Senator Mike Lee
Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary

cc: Chairman Andrew Furgeson, Federal Trade Commission
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division